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Abstract
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable
work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an
important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures,
where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the
interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price
competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model,
brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service
that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers.
To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer
different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand
game with price constraints at the providers’ level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and
providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.
Keywords: Service-oriented architecture, Quality of Service (QoS), oligopolistic competition, service
differentiation, Bertrand competition, price constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s highly competitive Internet service market, service providers, in order to survive, should
offer their customers more flexibility in their quality-of-service (QoS) / price offerings to meet a variety
of customer needs and application contraints. Clearly, any successful solution for a service provider to stay
in the market, not only depends on supporting new and updated technologies, but also involves economic
aspects. However, pricing the services of the network, even without considering quality differentiation,
is a challenging problem that involves different issues. There have been many studies that attempted to
address these issues with or without considering differentiated QoS. Pricing approaches include Paris
Metro pricing [29], congestion pricing [7, 15], rate-reliability pricing [19], and fairness pricing [18]. On
the other hand, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, such as computational clouds and recursive
networks [36], and network virtualization such as CABO [10] and also with the increasing number of
service brokerage companies such as Google in “Project Fi” [14], there is a need for more advanced
solutions that manage the interactions among service providers at multiple levels. The ultimate goal in
service-oriented architectures and network virtualization is to decouple the services offered by network
providers from those of service providers which yield the layered structure of the network. Also, brokers
as the intermediaries between clients and lower-level providers, play a key role in improving the efficiency
of service-oriented structures by matching the demands of clients to the services of providers. They can
downgrade or upgrade a service by sharing it among customers or by combining several services to satisfy
customers’ demand. For example, in “Project Fi”[14], Google offers a flat data rate of $10 per gigabyte
of data that is provided by either T-Mobile or Sprint, i.e., Google selects the best network provider based
on factors such as coverage and performance, thus adding flexibility and providing the best service to its
customers. Furthermore, Project Fi customers can manage their costs based on their monthly needs. This
2is in contrast to network providers, e.g., T-mobile and Sprint, which offer their customers fixed data plans
regulated by a static contract.
In this study we propose a multi-layer network market in which service brokers and service providers
compete at different levels in an oligopoly to maximize their profit. In our settings, brokers can pay a
cost to upgrade or downgrade the service that they buy from (lower-level) providers so as to offer a
new service to the market (customers). The broker incurs costs when adapting a lower-level service as it
expends resources to either enhance the service extended to its customers (e.g., by employing delay-jitter
reduction or capacity allocation techniques over a best-effort service) or degrade it (e.g., by multiplexing
client demands over a guaranteed service). We consider the competition among providers and among
brokers separately, while brokers impose some preference constraints on (infrastructure, cloud or service)
providers. We also consider conditions that may lead to a monopoly market and study how players act
under such conditions. We model service quality differentiation after Hotteling’s location model — [17],
where firms compete and price their products in only one dimension, geographic location. In our model,
brokers and (lower-level) providers compete and price their services based on the quality of the service that
they offer. Our numerical results show that more service differentiation generally yields more profit for
all players. However, besides quality differentiation, the cost that brokers undergo also plays an important
role and they should forgo maximum differentiation to reduce the cost, which leads to higher profit. Also,
as the number of brokers increases, the market gets more competitive and prices drop further.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: we model a two-layered network market in which
providers and brokers offer differentiated services and compete in a Bertrand game at each layer following
the Hotteling’s location model. We also analyze the actions of players under a monopoly setting. In
Section II we review related work, and then in Section III, we develop a game-theoretic model by
characterizing the competitive behavior of players with one another at each level of the service hierarchy.
Section IV presents our analysis and numerical results when only the interaction of two brokers is captured
in the model, while in Section IV-C we show how our model is useful to capture interactions among more
brokers, dissecting two more case studies where we consider three and four brokers. Finally, in Section V
we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been applied to a wide range of networking problems to capture the interaction of
(selfish or cooperating) players seeking a maximum value for their (private) utility. The assumption is
that every step (or move) toward the maximization of such utility impacts the utility of other players in
the model (or game). Given the connectivity nature of a network of agents, a wide range of networking
mechanisms have been modeled with game theory; from the physical ISO-OSI layer with transmission
power utility games [5] or spectrum sharing [2, 35] to Medium Access Control [37] to routing and packet
forwarding [4, 30], both in wireless [23] and wired [28] scenarios.
Aside from modeling multi-agent protocol behaviors and the various resource allocation mechanisms,
markets and pricing equilibrium have further exemplified the synergy between game theory (and eco-
nomics) and networked (cloud) systems [21, 31]. In particular, network economics has been a very
active research area in which both pricing and market regulation strategies have been studied widely.
However the exponential growth of Internet services in hierarchical (i.e., multi-layer) markets requires
a deeper study of new market features that will become available. One of the earliest work on layered
networks, [13] identifies and discusses some difficult economic problems related to resale and complexity
of competition among multiple owners of physical networks. The authors study some integrated and
unintegrated telecommunication companies and the services that they offer to create differentiated products
to cover their costs. The paper does not suggest any specific architecture or policies for pricing, but
discusses the need for a full economic model that features oligopolistic competition among a few large
companies that invest in the physical infrastructure as well as firms at the virtual network level.
Our work is inspired by Zhang et al. [39] and Nagurney and Wolf [27]. They propose an economic
model for the interaction and competition among service providers, network providers and users. Both
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and network providers compete in a Bertrand game. Stackelberg games have also been proposed in other
networking contexts, e.g., in Wi-Fi scenarios [38]. In our framework, providers at all levels compete in
Bertrand games (i.e., competition on price). Although our work shares the same two-level game with [27,
39], Zhang et al. [39] study a market with two service providers and two network providers offering
the same level of service quality. In [27] the authors consider a market with more than two providers
for service and network, in which network providers offer different levels of service quality. In their
model, the market is managed through the demand-price functions, which depend on both quality and
quantity. Our model considers a market where at the providers’ level, players can offer different qualities
of service, while at the brokers’ level, players can upgrade or downgrade the service to optimize their
profit. Semret et al. [34] also consider a retail market where, for each network, three types of players
interact: a service provider, a broker and end-users. However, their main contribution is a decentralized
auction-based bandwidth pricing for differentiated Internet services; the authors show that Progressive
Second Price (PSP) provides a stable pricing in a market where service providers receive most of the
profits and the brokers’ profit margin is small.
Pricing for single-level games has been studied even more extensively than two-level games. He and
Walrand [16] consider a self-regulated service model, where market demand determines the service quality.
In their model, there is a single Internet Service Provider (ISP) who offers two classes of service with
different prices to manage congestion. The authors show that when the price does not match the service
quality, the system may end up in an equilibrium similarly to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Shetty
et al.[35] also compare the revenue of a monopolist operator with and without service differentiation.
They show that the revenue is higher when an operator offers two different services. Both Li et al. [20]
and Fulp and Reeves [11] provide a traffic-sensitive pricing scheme for differentiated network services.
The focus of [11] is on maximizing the profit of the service provider who buys a differentiated service
connection from domain brokers and sells it to users; the focus of [20] instead is to provide economic
incentives to users so as to maintain a given level of traffic load.
Different game-theoretic models for differentiated service markets of users and service providers have
also been proposed [1, 22, 26]. In [26], the authors propose a game-theoretic model where service providers
compete with duration-based contracts for differentiated service. Instead, [1] considers a joint price-quality
market with a Stackelberg game where providers are leaders and users are followers. In their model,
providers consider the migration of users when setting their price and quality. Finally, the authors in [22]
study a congestion-prone market with usage-based pricing. They propose a model for users’ preference
over their value and sensitivity to congestion, and based on such model they characterize the market share
and optimal price for providers.
Our model considers multi-layer differentiated service games where the service obtained from the lower
level can be upgraded or downgraded, and hence can be sold to the higher level provider. In our analysis,
we apply price constraints when players’ optimal price would lead to losing market share, and we also
give insights on how players should then update their price.
III. MODEL AND SOLUTION
In this section, we present our model and analysis of a two-level game configuration and focus on
the competition among providers and brokers and what emerges as pricing of their services. Figure 1
illustrates the game-theoretic model: At the lower level, we have two service providers, while at the
higher level, we have m ≥ 2 service sellers or brokers that deal directly with users. Note that owning a
network infrastructure is expensive, and only a few large companies can afford its cost. There are however
many brokerage companies. Our model’s goal is limited to analyzing and understanding the dynamics of a
market in a formal economic setting. To this aim, we start by considering only two network / lower-level
providers in a simple oligopoly market competition. The exclusion of more complex relationships that
may exist in real markets keeps our model tractable while still producing interesting results and insights.
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Fig. 1. Game-theoretic Model of a Two-level Competition among Brokers and Service Providers. At each level, brokers and service providers
are in a Bertrand competition with each other. The set of strategies are the service prices and each player tries to maximize her revenue.
To model service quality differentiation, we adopt Hotteling’s location model [6, 17] which introduced
the idea of modeling difference between products as differences in a product’s location in a product space.
The idea is widely used for both location problems [24, 32, 33] and quality differentiation [8, 9, 25] in
network studies. In Hotteling’s model [17], there are two firms selling identical goods along a street.
Customers are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the space, and the transport cost is a linear function
of their distance to the selected firm. A consumer selects the firm that minimizes her cost of transportation
to buy the product. Hotteling concluded that two firms would locate close to each other near the center.
Later, D’Aspremont et al. [6] changed the utility function from linear to quadratic form, where firms
choose to maximize their distance to the opposite player, and there is equilibrium for price competition.
Brenner [3] extended the game with the quadratic cost function to more than two firms. He has shown
that for more than two firms, the “principle of maximum differentiation” does not hold, and corner firms
would benefit from moving marginally toward the market center. In our work, we model service quality
differentiation after Hotteling’s product differentiation, where customers have different preference for
service quality that is modeled by their willingness to pay for that quality. We start by presenting our
notation and some basic settings, then we discuss some analytical and numerical results.
A. Model Description
Let us consider a system with a continuum of customers, m service sellers (brokers), denoted by
Bi, i = 1, . . . ,m, and two service providers, Sj, j = 1, 2. We assume that customers have different
preference for quality (utility) described by:
θq − p
where θ is the customer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality q, and p is the price of service. There
is a distribution of θ among customers. For simplicity, we assume that θ is uniformly distributed on an
interval θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] and θmax > 2 θmin. Customers seek a broker that maximizes their utility.
Both brokers and service providers can offer services with different qualities. The service quality
offered by brokers is denoted by qi and is in an interval q ∈ [qmin, qmax], and the quality offered by
service providers is denoted by Qj . Also, we assume that brokers and service providers compete in an
imperfectly competitive market. Furthermore, we assume that there is no supply constraint and so there
are enough resources to meet each demand. We also assume that each broker buys just from one of the
service providers that is more economical. Without loss of generality, we assume that B1 buys from S1
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and other brokers choose the provider with the lower cost.
We assume that providers, and brokers, compete with each other in a Bertrand game. In a Bertrand
game, players compete on the price based on their cost and other market information. We analyze the
market at the Nash equilibrium point where the market is in steady state and no player intends to change
her price.
B. Demand Distribution
Brokers first choose the quality of service that they will provide to customers, then they compete on
prices. If the brokers choose the same quality, then the customers decide only based on the price, and
this leads to a Bertrand competition with identical goods, whose prices should be set equal to costs, and
no one makes profit. Thus the brokers should choose to offer different service qualities to make profits.
Without loss of generality, we assume that qm > ... > q2 > q1, and also Q2 > Q1. Therefore, customers
with a high willingness to pay for quality will buy from Bm, while customers with a low willingness will
buy from B1.
For simplicity, first let’s assume that we have two brokers, B1 and B2. We can characterize the demand
for each broker by identifying the customers who are indifferent between the two differentiated qualities.
The indifferent customers, denoted by θ∗, satisfy:
θ∗q1 − p1 = θ∗q2 − p2 ⇔ θ∗ = p2 − p1
q2 − q1 (1)
Having uniformly distributed θ, the demand for each broker, B1 and B2, is given by:
D1(p1, p2) =
θ∗ − θmin
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(
p2 − p1
q2 − q1 − θmin)
D2(p1, p2) =
θmax − θ∗
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(θmax − p2 − p1
q2 − q1 )
(2)
where ∆θ ≡ θmax − θmin.
For more than two brokers, we can generalize equation (1) to find indifferent customers θ∗i between
any two brokers Bi and Bi+1:
θ∗i qi − pi = θ∗i qi+1 − pi+1 ⇔ θ∗i =
pi+1 − pi
qi+1 − qi (3)
Consequently, the demand for each broker can be found by :
D1(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θ∗1 − θmin
∆θ
Di(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θ∗i − θ∗i−1
∆θ
1 < i < m
Dm(p1, p2, . . . , pm) =
θmax − θ∗m−1
∆θ
(4)
Note that in the above equations Di’s assume values in the interval [0, 1]. This means that if for broker
Bi the demand Di is negative, then Bi is “out of the market”; more precisely, we can rewrite the demand
function as:
Di = min
{
max
{
0,
θ∗i − θ∗i−1
∆θ
}
, 1
}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m (5)
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Now that we have the demand distribution, we can calculate broker i’s profit, assuming that converting
Qj to qi (whether to upgrade or downgrade the service) has a marginal cost ci:
Πi = piDi − qiDi
Qj
rj − ciDi(Qj − qi)2 (6)
where rj is the price of service that broker Bi pays to service provider Sj and qiDiQj is the amount of
service that Bi needs to buy to supply its own market. We assume here that the cost to the broker, ci, for
converting the service quality it gets (Qj) to that it offers its customers (qi), is proportional to the square
of the difference in quality, (Qj − qi). Intuitively, the cost increases more rapidly as the service quality
increases, or alternatively, there is a diminishing return in service quality as more resources are allocated
and cost increases. We henceforth, for simplicity, assume that ci = c.
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that the broker with lowest quality (B1) buys from the lower
quality provider (S1) and the highest quality broker (Bm) buys from the higher quality provider (S2). This
is the only valid assumption to have an oligopoly market at the level of service providers. For simplicity,
again let’s assume that we have two Brokers. If B1 prefers to buy from S2, then the cost of buying from
S2 must be less than the cost of buying from S1:
q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 −Q2)2 < q1
Q1
r1 + c(q1 −Q1)2
Given (q1−Q2)2 > (q1−Q1)2, we have r2Q2 < r1Q1 . Thus, given r2Q2 < r1Q1 , and also (q2−Q2)2 < (q2−Q1)2,
we deduce that it is less costly for broker B2 to buy from S2 as well, which results in a monopoly market
at the level of service providers. The same logic applies if B2 prefers to buy from S1, and also for general
case with m brokers.
Now that we have the profit function for brokers, we can find the optimal price for them. In the first
stage, given the service prices rj , and service qualities Qj , the brokers compete in a Bertrand game with
differentiated goods. We present the results for case m = 2, but all of results can be calculated for general
cases with more than two brokers. Plugging Equation (2) into Equation (6), and solving ∂Πi/∂pi = 0 for
achieving Nash equilibrium, leads to:
p1 =
1
3
((q2 − q1) (θmax − 2θmin) + 2q1r1
Q1
+
q2r2
Q2
+ 2c (q1 −Q1) 2 + c (q2 −Q2) 2) (7)
p2 =
1
3
((q2 − q1) (2θmax − θmin) + q1r1
Q1
+
2q2r2
Q2
+ c (q1 −Q1) 2 + 2c (q2 −Q2) 2) (8)
Now we have the brokers’ prices, p1 and p2, as a function of the brokers’ and providers’ service qualities,
and providers’ prices rj’s. The next step is to plug them into Di’s to make demand function as a function
of rj’s :
D1 =
1
3∆θ
(θmax − 2θmin) +
q2r2
Q2
− q1r1
Q1
− c (q1 −Q1) 2 + c (q2 −Q2) 2
3∆θ (q2 − q1) (9)
D2 =
1
3∆θ
(2θmax − θmin) +
q1r1
Q1
− q2r2
Q2
+ c (q1 −Q1) 2 − c (q2 −Q2) 2
3∆θ (q2 − q1) (10)
Now, D1 and D2 are dependent on service providers’ prices rj’s, which shows the interaction between
the two layers. Providers’ prices are part of the cost for brokers and in turn affect the price of brokers
and consequently the demands of both brokers and providers. In the next subsection we show how to find
the optimal rj’s.
7D. Providers’ Profits
At this stage, we have the total demand served by (service sold by) each broker. To have an imperfectly
competitive market at the level of service providers, the combination of their price and quality should be
such that each broker prefers a different service provider. Assuming B1 prefers S1 and B2 prefers S2, the
following inequalities should hold for B1 and B2, respectively:
q1
Q1
r1 + c(q1 −Q1)2 < q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 −Q2)2
q2
Q2
r2 + c(q2 −Q2)2 < q2
Q1
r1 + c(q2 −Q1)2
(11)
These constraints ensure that broker B1 chooses provider S1 and B2 chooses S1, as the cost is lower
than that of getting service from the other provider. Later we will discuss the situation when one of these
constraints is violated.
For general case, we assume that the k first brokers choose provider S1 and from broker Bk+1 to broker
Bm choose S2. Constraint (11) should be hold for Bk and Bk+1 instead of B1 and B2.
In this stage of the game, service providers compete in another Bertrand game. The profit of each
provider is defined as:
U1 =
k∑
i=1
Diqi
Q1
(r1 − f1)− eQ21
U2 =
n∑
i=k+1
Diqi
Q2
(r2 − f2)− eQ22
(12)
where eQ2j is the cost of providing quality Qj , rj is the service price and fi represents some general cost
(fee). After plugging Equations (9) and (10) into the providers’ profit, we obtain quadratic equations in rj .
To obtain the optimal solution (Nash equilibrium), we solve ∂Uj/∂rj = 0 which for two brokers yields:
r1 =
2f1
3
+
f2q2Q1
3q1Q2
+
Q1
3q1
× [c(q2 −Q2)2 − c(q1 −Q1)2 − (q1 − q2)(4θmax − 5θmin)]
r2 =
2f2
3
+
f1q1Q2
3q2Q1
+
Q2
3q2
× [c(q1 −Q1)2 − c(q2 −Q2)2 − (q1 − q2)(5θmax − 4θmin)]
By substituting rj’s in Equations (7) and (8), we get the final values for pi’s only as functions of user
preferences and service qualities:
p1 =
1
9
(
5c(q1 −Q1)2 + 4c(q2 −Q2)2
)
+
4f2q2Q1 + 5f1q1Q2
9Q1Q2
+
1
9
(q2 − q1)(16θmax − 20θmin)
p2 =
1
9
(
4c(q1 −Q1)2 + 5c(q2 −Q2)2
)
+
5f2q2Q1 + 4f1q1Q2
9Q1Q2
+
1
9
(q2 − q1)(20θmax − 16θmin)
We obtain the final values for Di’s from Equations (9) and (10):
D1 =
1
9∆θ
(4θmax − 5θmin) + c(q1 −Q1)
2 − c(q2 −Q2)2
9∆θ(q1 − q2) +
−f2q2Q1 +Q2f1q1
9∆θ(q1 − q2)Q1Q2
D2 =
1
9∆θ
(5θmax − 4θmin) + c(q2 −Q2)
2 − c(q1 −Q1)2
9∆θ(q1 − q2) +
f2q2Q1 −Q2f1q1
9∆θ(q1 − q2)Q1Q2
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In the previous setting we assumed that customers buy service from either B1 or B2, even if their
utility is negative. Here we solve a game with only positive utility customers, i.e., customers whose value
of θq − p is positive. Therefore, customers with zero utility provide a lower bound on θ (we call it θ0),
which can be found by solving θ0q1 − p1 = 0. Thus θmin is replaced by p1q1 :
D1(p1, . . . , pm) =
θ∗1 − θ0
∆θ
=
1
∆θ
(
p2 − p1
q2 − q1 −
p1
q1
) (13)
As in our previous setting, this is a two-stage Bertrand game, and the Nash equilibrium for each game
is found by replacing the Di’s into the profit functions and solving ∂Πi/∂pi = 0 and ∂Ui/∂ri = 0. We
discuss the difference between this positive utility game and the previous (unconstrained utility) game
later in Section IV.
F. Game with Constraints
At the lower level of service providers, the constraints (11) are not considered while calculating the
equilibrium points. Therefore, in some situations, one of the constraints might be violated. Let us assume
that after finding r1’s, the constraint for B1 is violated, i.e., q1Q1 r1 + c(q1 − Q1)2 ≥
q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 − Q2)2.
This means that, under this condition, for broker B1, it incurs more cost to buy service from provider
S1 than provider S2; so if provider S1 does not change its price, B1 will get service from S2, and this
situation leads to a monopoly market at the providers’ level.
To find an optimal point that also meets the constraints (11), provider S1 should set its price such that
r1 <
Q1
q1
( q1
Q2
r2 + c(q1 − Q2)2 − c(q1 − Q1)2). In response, provider S2 updates its price by plugging r1
into ∂U2/∂r2 = 0 which leads to r2 = f(r1), i.e., r2 as a function of r1. Thus, S1 can replace the r2 with
f(r1) in its inequality to calculate an optimal price that satisfies the constraint:
r1 =
Q1
q1
(
q1
Q2
f(r1) + c(q1 −Q2)2 − c(q1 −Q1)2
)
−   > 0
In this stage of the game, S1 should find a positive value for  that maximizes its profit. By substituting
r1 and r2 as functions of , U1 is a decreasing quadratic function of . Solving ∂U1/∂ = 0 results in
optimal . If  < 0, it can be replaced with a small positive number close to zero. Since U1 is decreasing
with respect to , any other positive value larger than the chosen  leads to less profit. Clearly, the new set
of prices for the service providers is an equilibrium point for the game, since it maximizes the revenue
of both providers while meeting the constraints so each service provider does not lose its market (i.e.,
one of the two brokers stays as its customer); therefore neither of the service providers has an incentive
to change its price independently.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we present some numerical results to illustrate the effect of choosing different qualities
of service by brokers. We consider settings with two, three and four brokers. We also study the positive
game model for two brokers. We show in detail how the best strategy for any broker is to choose a quality
level that maximizes quality differentiation with other brokers. Also, when there are more brokers, the
higher competition leads to more reasonable prices and a lower probability of a monopoly market.
A. Two Brokers
For the two brokers case, we consider a setting where θmax = 1.5, θmin = 0.2, c = 0.1, and fi =
.01265×Q1.5i . The service quality of the providers are set to Q1 = 20 and Q2 = 45. For the brokers, q2
varies between 30 and 60, and we set q1 to different values such that it is less than, equal to, or larger
than Q1 to see how the market changes under different conditions.
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Fig. 2. Price, profit and demand distribution for broker B1, and price of its provider S1, for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the
service quality offered by brokers changes.
Examining a first set of plots shown in Figures 2 and 3, we note that the total demand constitutes the
whole market. So, when the demand for one broker/provider side decreases, the demand for the other
side increases and vice versa. But this is not the case for prices and profits – they increase or decrease
together. Furthermore, observing the behavior for different values of q1, we see from the brokers’ and
providers’ price plots, when broker B1 downgrades the lower-level service obtained from its provider S1
(i.e., q1 < Q1), all brokers and providers can offer their service at higher prices and make more profit.
Similarly, by comparing the behavior for higher values of q2, where q2 > Q2, with that for lower values
where q2 < Q2, we observe that a better strategy for broker B2 is to upgrade the lower-level service
that it obtains from S2 (i.e., q2 > Q2). This happens because upgrading q2 or downgrading q1 leads to a
larger gap between q1 and q2, therefore the two sets of broker and provider can offer more differentiated
services at higher prices. In fact it follows the maximum differentiation principle. In this setting, since
we have the minimum number of brokers to compete, it’s more likely that monopoly situations happen.
For example, for q1 = 29, the market exhibits abnormal behavior when the gap between q1 and q2 is
small, while the gap between providers’ qualities and brokers’ qualities is large. Specifically, the market
approaches a monopoly where S2 and B2 have a small market share when broker B2 is downgrading the
service obtained from its service provider S2, i.e., q2 < Q2. Observing the results when the values of q2
are close to 30, we note that here, although the providers’ game is a monopoly at some points where
S2’s price r2 = 0, the brokers’ game is not, and B2 can have a small share of the market D2 while it
gets service from provider S1. This is because when the gap between q1 and q2 is not significant, most
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Fig. 3. Price, profit and demand distribution for broker B2, and price of its provider S2, for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the
service quality offered by brokers changes.
of the customers prefer the cheaper service provided by broker B1. When the market is a monopoly,
the provider or broker who remains in the market can increase its price to a value such that the other
competitor cannot enter the market even if it lowers its price to equal its cost, thus there is no way for
the competitor to make profit and is prevented from entering the market.
On the other hand, for q1 = 29, when broker B2 is upgrading the service quality obtained from S2, i.e.,
q2 > Q2, as the gap between q2 and Q2 gets larger, S2 starts to decrease its price to cover the cost of the
quality upgrade for B2 so as not to lose its market share. Since the value of q1 is somewhere between
Q1 and Q2, it is more economical for B1 to buy service from S2 rather than S1 at the optimal prices,
i.e., the optimal price of S1 violates constraints (11) and it should update its price r1 as we explained in
Section III-F. Consequently, S2 should also update its price. Since there is a substantial gap between q1
and q2, both providers can compete in the market.
B. Positive Utility Results
We now consider the case of positive utility competition. Intuitively, we expect to see some restriction
on the prices for all brokers and providers, otherwise they lose part of the market for which the utility
(θq − p) is negative. Thus it is a compromise between price and demand. The numerical results confirm
this intuition. Comparing the prices of brokers and providers under positive utility and unconstrained
utility, for the same conditions, shows that the highest prices under positive utility are below half of the
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Fig. 4. Price, profit and demand distribution for the positive utility game, for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality
offered by brokers changes.
prices in the latter case, while the demands are less as well; compare Figures 4 and 5 with Figures 2 and
3.
Also in this positive utility game, whether brokers upgrade or downgrade the service obtained from
their providers, the behavior is different from that in the unconstrained utility game. Specifically, since the
positive utility market is more sensitive to prices, a smaller gap between the service quality offered by the
broker and the quality it gets from its provider yields more profit. Furthermore, while for both brokers,
upgrading the service obtained from lower-level providers (and in turn, selling a higher quality service
to customers) is generally more profitable, B2 makes more profit when B1 downgrades the obtained
(lower-level) service, and B1 makes slightly more profit when B2 upgrades the obtained (lower-level)
service.
Unlike the unconstrained utility game, if profit increases for one player, profit decreases for the other
player. Another interesting observation from these plots is when the market is a monopoly: while there
are conditions under which broker B1 or B2 can lose their market share, service provider S1 can manage
to stay in the market under all conditions.
C. Results with Three and Four Brokers
In this section we extend our setting to three and four brokers to see if the maximum differentiation
principle holds for more brokers. We assume that two brokers offering the lowest and the highest quality
of service to users are already in the market and define the range of feasible quality. We then let the other
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Fig. 5. Price, profit and demand distribution for the positive utility game, for Q1 = 20, Q2 = 45, 30 ≤ q2 ≤ 60, as the service quality
offered by brokers changes.
one or two brokers enter the market with a quality level chosen in such range. After fixing a quality level,
the third (and fourth) broker obtains service from the (lower-level) provider that minimizes the quality
difference between them. This in turn minimizes the broker’s cost in providing service to its customers.
As in previous case studies with only two brokers, we show results at the equilibrium of the game by
identifying indifferent customers between available service qualities. We also apply all constraints on the
providers’ level to have an oligopoly market.
1) Three Brokers: We simulate the game with θmin = 1, θmax = 70, two providers S1 and S2 with
Q1 = 30 and Q2 = 60, and three brokers, B1, B2 and B3, with qualities q1, q2 and q3, respectively. We
assume that the quality levels of B1 and B3 are fixed and we let the quality of broker B2 change in the
interval (q1, q3). Broker B2 chooses the service provider with least quality difference to reduce its (service
conversion) cost. Given the above settings, we observe a tipping point for the quality of broker B2 (q2):
for q2 < 45, B2 chooses provider S1 and for q2 > 45 B2 chooses provider S2; for the frontier value of
q2 = 45, although there is no quality differentiation between the two (lower-level) providers, we observe
that downgrading the service has less cost than upgrading it, therefore B2 chooses to get its service from
S2. The jump in profit at q2 = 45 in Figure 6 is because of B2’s switching provider.
As we can see in Figure 6, for brokers B1 and B3, which have been already in the market, it is more
profitable if broker B2 chooses to offer a quality with the maximum difference from their quality, while for
broker B2 it is more profitable to have maximum difference with both B1 and B3. As we have observed in
the case of two brokers, it is not advisable to choose a quality of service similar to that of other providers.
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Fig. 6. Profit of each broker in a three-broker case for varying q2.
Intuitively, this is because the more difference in the service quality that they offer customers, brokers are
more likely to serve customers at a higher price. We note this by observing that the optimal quality for
broker B2 is the average of the other fixed brokers’ qualities (q1 and q3). For example, in the first plot
from left in Figure 6, the optimal q2 = 50, which is obtained from (q1 + q3)/2 = (10 + 90)/2.
We also change the fixed service qualities of brokers B1 and B3 toward the optimal quality for B2 to
see how the market changes and compare such results with those of Hotelling’s location model with more
than two firms [3]. As we can see in Figure 6, unlike the Hotelling’s model [3] where corner firms have
a tendency to move toward internal firms, here all brokers make less profit when quality differentiation
decreases. However, for broker B3, its market share increases (Figure 7), though the effect of dropping the
price (Figure 8) is more pronounced than the extra share of the market. Therefore, unlike the Hotelling’s
location model, for three firms, the market follows the maximum differentiation principle and brokers
make more profit when their service qualities are more different from each other. In the following setting
we study four brokers to see if this pattern repeats.
2) Four Brokers: In this setting, we simulate a scenario with two brokers, B1 and B4 already in the
market and offering fixed service qualities q1 = 10 and q4 = 90, respectively, and two other brokers, B2
and B3, that enter the market later. Without loss of generality, we assume that q2 < q3. Figure 9 shows
the changes in profit for brokers B2 and B3. We omit the results for B1 and B4 since they follow the
same pattern as in the previous case study with three brokers, i.e., the more differentiation between their
qualities and those we set for B2 and B3, the higher is their profit. This means that such brokers are not
the decision makers in this situation.
As we observe in Figure 9, for broker B3, whose quality is between q2 and q4, the optimal quality
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Fig. 7. Demand of each broker in a three-broker case for varying q2.
q3 value is one that yields maximum differentiation from both qualities q2 and q4, which is close to the
average of q2 and q4. For broker B2 we expect instead that the optimal quality level is around q2 = 37,
that is, the quality with maximum difference from q1 (10) and the optimal q3 (which equals 64 given
maximum quality differentiation among all brokers). However, we observe that the optimal quality for
B2 is at q2 = 45, when broker B2 switches from provider S1 to provider S2 and instead of upgrading
the quality, downgrades the service that it obtains from provider S2 (recall that Q1 = 30 and Q2 = 60).
To understand why B2 violates the maximum differentiation rule, we analyze the situations under both
q2 = 37 and q2 = 45.
For q2 = 37, the optimal value for B3 is q3 = 56, and not the expected value of q3 = 64. To explain this
situation, we should consider that in making profit, besides quality differentiation with other competitors
(brokers), the cost of buying the lower-level service is also important. In this case, broker B3 makes more
profit if it chooses q3 = 56 and downgrades the service it obtains from S2 (recall Q2 = 60) instead of
choosing q3 = 64 and upgrading the service. Broker B3 can then offer a quality-price combination that
attracts more customers, while because of the sufficient gap between q2 and q3, the competition on the
price is not tough. However, in this situation, broker B2 is upgrading the service that it obtains from
provider S1 (recall Q1 = 30) and to compete with broker B3, it cannot offer a high price, and the profit
that it makes is relatively low.
On the other hand, for q2 = 45, the situation is reversed. B2 downgrades the service that it obtains
from provider S2, while B3 at its optimal point is upgrading the service. So the combination of quality-
price of broker B2 attracts more customers which leads to making more profit. Therefore in this game,
besides maximum quality differentiation, the cost that brokers undergo is also playing an important role
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Fig. 8. Price of each broker in a three-broker case for varying q2.
and sometimes brokers should compromise on maximum differentiation to reduce cost.
Assuming rational players, i.e., the two new brokers pick the quality that maximizes their profit, we
compare the price of the service that such brokers offer for the case studies of three and four brokers
(Figures 8 and 10). In the case of three brokers, we observe that the optimal quality for broker B2 is at
q2 = 50 while q1 = 10 and q3 = 90. The optimal price for brokers in this setting is p1 = 2092, p2 = 3203
and p3 = 5447, respectively. When four brokers are playing the game, the optimal quality for broker B2
is q2 = 45 and for broker B3 is q3 = 66. In this situation, the optimal prices are p1 = 1746, p2 = 2535,
p3 = 3442 and p4 = 4869. As we can see, the price of service with quality 10 and 90 drops from 2092 and
5447 to 1746 and 4869, respectively. So, when there are more competitors in the market, the gap between
their service qualities decreases, the competition on the price becomes tougher and brokers should offer
their services at lower prices to be able to attract customers and make profit.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among players in
a multi-level market. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between users and service providers,
adapt the quality of the service that they get from lower-level providers so as to attract more customers
and maximize their profit. The game consists of two service providers, two, three or four brokers, and
users, though we study more extensively the case with two brokers. Numerical results show that the more
differentiation between the quality of service offered by brokers, the higher is their profit. However in some
situations, besides quality differentiation, cost plays an important role and forces brokers to compromise
on quality differentiation with their competitors to reduce cost and make more profit. An interesting result
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Fig. 9. Profit of brokers B2 and B3 in a four-broker setting.
in the two brokers game is that although players compete for more profit, the competition only affects
their market share; the profit increases for one player if it increases for the other one. But this is not
the case for more brokers. When there are more than two brokers, the market is more competitive and
brokers should offer their services at lower prices to be able to stay in the market.
We also studied situations where all brokers prefer to buy service from just one of the lower-level
providers, i.e., the providers’ market is about to become a monopoly. We developed a Bertrand game
with price constraints to keep the market as an oligopoly if possible. Moreover, for the two brokers
game, we explored the case where customers buy the service only if the combination of price-quality
has positive utility for them. In this situation, players (brokers) try to offer the service cheaper to attract
more customers. Unlike the unconstrained utility game with two brokers, if profit increases for one player,
profit decreases for the other player.
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